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SINS OF OMISSION
Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New York: Carroll and
Graf, 2004. 562pp. $16.95

Interventions by the United Nations for
the purpose of establishing and maintaining peace have a mixed record.
Some have been reasonably successful,
such as in East Timor, while others,
such as Rwanda, have not. Roméo
Dallaire, the author, a retired lieutenant
general in the Canadian army, suggests
that efforts by the United Nations Security Council largely depend upon the
location of the problem area. East
Timor, just to the north of Australia
and on the flank of major shipping
routes, met the requirements. Rwanda,
in his opinion, did not.
Under the Charter of the United Nations, interventions may be governed by
Chapter 6, which stipulates that the
peacekeeping contingent is not to use
force but to separate the warring sides,
all the while maintaining a neutral
stance. However, under Chapter 7, UN
troops are authorized to use force to
keep the antagonists apart. Dallaire
speaks of a Chapter 6½, a hybrid of
the two without official UN sanction.
When the decision was made to send a
Chapter 6 mission to Rwanda, the Canadians, whose army had had considerable
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experience in the peacekeeping field,
offered to provide a commander, some
of the staff, and logistic support.
Dallaire, who had recently been promoted to the rank of general and whose
tour in Canada had come to an end,
leaped at the opportunity to go to
Rwanda when the command was offered. Upon reporting to UN headquarters in New York, Dallaire was told that
his resources were limited and that the
mission had to be small. He was ordered to design the mission to fit those
parameters and not the demands of the
actual situation. A devout Catholic, he
was particularly interested in protecting
human life. Such commitment, not uncommon among military personnel, can
turn conventional wisdom on its head.
Belgium had acquired Rwanda from
Germany in the 1920 League of Nations
Mandate and in 1925 united it administratively with the Belgian Congo, which
lay to the west. Like most European
powers with colonial dependencies, Belgium staffed much of its governing apparatus with native civil servants—the
Tutsis—who for the most part were
better educated than other Rwandans
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and in many ways resembled Europeans. The Tutsis also captured the top
jobs in commercial enterprises. The
other principal tribe, the Hutus, were
not happy with this development.
When Rwanda achieved its independence from Belgium in 1962 and
promptly installed a Hutu-dominated
government, they were in a position to
exact revenge on the formerly elite
Tutsi population.
Many Tutsis fled to neighboring
Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire. The Tutsis
slowly gathered strength in those havens and developed (by African standards) a first-class army. By the early
1990s the Tutsi army was prepared to
invade Rwanda and install a Tutsi government. Threatened by the imminent
return of their enemies, the Hutus quietly encouraged the formation of vigilante groups to drive out or murder
remaining Tutsis, as well as moderate
Hutus. Matters had reached this stage
when Dallaire arrived in the Rwandan
capital, Kigali, in August 1993.
In addition to being the military representative of the UN, Dallaire was also
temporarily assigned the position of
political representative. When no one
was immediately assigned to replace
him in the latter post, the Canadians
should have sensed the general lack of
interest on the part of UN authorities.
Naive in the ways of the UN bureaucracy, however, Dallaire was optimistic
that he could perform his mission to
the fullest extent. Eventually, in late October 1993, the United Nations sent a
political representative with the somewhat improbable name Jacques-Roger
Booh-Booh, former Cameroonian foreign minister and a friend of the UN
secretary-general, Boutros BoutrosGhali. Interested primarily in the
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“perks” of the office, Booh-Booh was to
prove useless. Further, the forces provided for the mission (known as
UNAMIR, for United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda) were grossly
inadequate. Its troops, Ghanaian and
Tunisian, were brave, well trained, and
professionally led, but they arrived
without equipment. Pleas by Dallaire to
UN headquarters for equipment and logistic support from the major powers
fell on deaf ears. The United States,
Britain, and France had no interest in
the mission, although France did send
aircraft to evacuate Europeans caught
in Rwanda by the hostilities; requests by
Africans for rescue were denied.
Not long after Dallaire arrived, an informant in the Rwandan government
told him of weapon caches hidden by
the extremist militias. The general immediately requested permission to find
and destroy them but was refused on
the grounds that such action would violate the neutrality of the mission under
Chapter 6; nor was Dallaire permitted
to engage in intelligence operations. Instead, he was directed to identify the
informer to the Rwandan government.
Dallaire honored the order not to destroy the arms, but he refused to betray
the informant. In any event, the
source’s information soon dried up
when the futility of the situation became unmistakable.
The corruption of the extremist government authorities, the elimination of the
moderates, and the subsequent mass
murder, amounting to genocide, is too
involved to discuss adequately in this
review. Suffice it to say that approximately eight hundred thousand Africans—men, women, and children,
nearly all of them innocent civilians—
were killed, some after severe torture.
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Dallaire is especially hard on France,
Britain, and the United States for their
refusal to provide assistance or authorize the UN to take timely measures to
block the massacre. He attributes their
inaction in part to France’s other interests in the region (the president’s son is
said to have had business interests in
Rwanda) and to fear in the Clinton administration of another Somalia debacle.
(Although Dallaire does not mention it,
the Clinton administration’s lack of response was to have severe consequences
for the United States when Osama Bin
Laden interpreted its unwillingness to
act as American weakness.) Dallaire is
not easy on Canada either. He refuses
in his book to place blame on anyone
within the UN leadership; however, in a
later interview with a San Francisco radio talk-show host, Dallaire thoroughly
castigated Boutros-Ghali as having been
more responsible than anyone else for
the genocide.
Command of UNAMIR had profound effects on the Canadian general, among
them post-traumatic stress disorder.
When he was relieved and returned to
Canada, he was offered, and he accepted,
the number-two post in the Canadian
army. Haunted by his experience in
Rwanda, he retired before his term ended.
This is an excellent example of a good
and highly competent man deeply disturbed by international failures and the
Machiavellian tactics of world powers.
His experience with the United Nations
raises the question of how far a military
commander should go in honoring orders from civilian authority. The precedent of the Nuremburg trials provides
military officers with sanction to refuse
orders that would produce sins of commission. But what about the “sins of
omission”? There are no precedents,
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which arguably prevented Dallaire from
taking measures to block the genocide.
In the book’s preface, Dallaire recounts
how a retired army chaplain asked him
if he still believed in God after his African experience. His reply was “yes, because he had shaken hands with the
Devil.” The work has had wide success
in Canada but not as yet in the United
States. (The American reader should
note that morning or evening “prayers”
refers to staff consultations, not religious observances.) Shake Hands with
the Devil is an important book and
should be read by every military officer
and senior noncommissioned officer.
ROBERT C. WHITTEN

Commander, USNR (Retired)
Cupertino, Calif.

Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America’s Second
War against Iraq. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005. 205pp. $49.90

Jeffrey Record is one of the nation’s
most experienced and respected defense
analysts. His latest critique of the 2003
Iraq war, Dark Victory, provides many
important insights into the reasons for
the war and for its successes and failures. More generally, this work is a case
study of the challenges of transforming
military victory into a victory with
meaningful and lasting strategic impact.
In many ways this book focuses on the
critical difference between “war fighter”
and “war winner,” and on the fact that
conflict termination and its aftermath
are at least as critical as any phase of
battle proper.
Record, however, writes as a critic of a
war he does not believe in, and of a
nation-building process he sees as a
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